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During the Civil War, the federal government began to charter national banks.  
These banks enjoyed the privilege of being licensed to issue national bank notes, which 
were default risk-free liabilities of the banks, backed 111% by U.S. Treasury bonds 
deposited by issuing banks at the U.S. Treasury.
1  The creation of these new banks, 
combined with a 10% annual tax on state bank note issues, soon resulted in the 
supplanting of state banks’ notes by the new national bank notes.  
Scholars have long puzzled over the observation that national banks did not take 
greater advantage of the authority to issue notes.  The aggregate supply of notes never 
reached its maximum permissible level, despite calculations measuring the profitability 
of allocating capital toward bank note supply collateralized by bonds (e.g., as derived by 
Cagan 1965) indicating that national bank note issuance was more profitable than the 
typical profit earned by allocating bank capital toward lending funded by a combination 
of deposits and capital. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 23) write: 
Before 1890 the amount outstanding ranged around 20 per cent of the possible 
maximum, by 1900 it had risen to about 28 per cent, and by World War I to about 
80 percent.  The maximum was in fact approached only in the twenties, when for 
the first time U.S. bonds deposited to secure circulation and government deposits 
(which also required such security) nearly equaled the total of eligible bonds. 
Before 1905, the capital stock of national banks set narrower limits to their 
maximum possible note issue than did the total of eligible bonds, but the actual 
issue did not approach this lower limit either.  Thereafter, the capital stock of 
national banks exceeded the total of eligible bonds and hence was not the 
effective limit on note issue.  Yet, despite the failure to use fully the possibilities 
of note issue, the published market prices of government bonds bearing the 
circulation privilege were apparently always low enough to make note issue 
profitable except in the years 1884 to 1891. The fraction of the maximum issued 
fluctuated with the profitability of issue, but the fraction was throughout lower 
than might have been expected.  We have no explanation for this puzzle. 
                                                 
1 After 1874, banks also had to deposit a 5% minimum cash redemption fund at the Treasury in 
addition to these bonds. 
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Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) argued that profits from note issue 
were large on the margin, because bond issues to back note issues remained cheap and 
because banks could easily leverage their capital devoted to those bond purchases.
2  In 
their discussions of potential constraints on bank note issues, they pointed to the more 
than adequate aggregate supply of bonds, and while they recognized that regulations 
constrained bank note issuing relative to bank capital, they argued that bank capital was 
not a constraint because its aggregate amount exceeded the amount required for 
increased note issues. 
The reasoning typically advanced to explain low national bank note issuance 
posits hidden transacting costs, either in the form of physical note redemption costs or the 
costs of maintaining cash balances in support of bank note issues. Authors like Bell 
(1912), Cagan (1965), Goodhart (1965), Cagan and Schwartz (1991), Duggar and Rost 
(1969), and Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1992) argue that redemption costs may have 
been large enough to explain bankers’ reluctance to issue despite the seeming 
profitability from expanding the supply of notes.  
James (1978) was the first to suggest that aggregate calculations, like those 
provided by Cagan and Friedman and Schwartz, might be providing a misleading picture 
of national bank note profitability.  He showed that cross-sectional variation in the 
regional supply of bank notes was large and consistent with regional variation in the 
opportunity cost of note issuance (that is, regional variation in the profitability of bank 
                                                 
2 Cagan and Schwartz (1991) point out that one can restate the puzzle of underissuance as the 
puzzling absence of a large premium on U.S. Treasury bonds (i.e., lower bond yields). High 
profits from note issuing should have led national banks to bid up the price of bonds (in order to 
satisfy legal backing requirements for note issues), which should have raised the premium on 
bonds, and thus eliminated allegedly excess profits. 
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lending).  In James’ view, at least some of the puzzle of low bank note issuance was 
explicable by the high profitability of bank lending in the South and West, where note 
issuance was relatively low.  But James’ explanation was not a complete one.  After 
1874, there were no regional limits on note issuance, suggesting that banks in the East 
(where loan profitability was relatively low) should have substantially increased their 
outstanding notes.  Why did the banks in the East not issue more notes? 
Hetherington (1990) showed that some of the time variation in the extent of note 
issue could be explained by changes in rules governing note issues.  But that approach 
did not explain the puzzle posed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965); 
like James’ (1978) explanation of cross-state variation in note issuance, Hetherington’s 
(1990) explanation of some of the variation in supply over time did not address the 
persistent underissue of bank notes: the level of bank notes remained far below its 
maximum despite the high profitability of note issuing.  
In this paper, we test the various theories of note underissuance with 
microeconomic data. We are able to resolve much of the puzzle of note underissuance by 
disaggregating data on national banks and analyzing individual banks’ note issuing 
incentives and constraints. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) compared 
average profitability of note issuing and lending, and considered the aggregate supply of 
bonds and the aggregate amount of bank capital.  But that is not the correct way to take 
account of regulatory constraints on note issues.  It is possible that regulatory limits on 
bank note issues were binding on many individual banks. If, as James argued, some 
banks faced high opportunity costs (leading them to limit note issuing), and if other banks 
earning lower profits from lending were issuing the maximum amount of notes that they 
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were permitted to issue by law, then it may be that there is no puzzle of “underissuance.” 
We take account of the legal constraints facing individual banks that limited their 
maximum (and minimum) permissible note issuance. 
In fact, we will show that many banks (61% of national banks in 1880 and 21% in 
1900) were at a “corner solution” (issuing the maximum amount of notes that they could 
legally issue), while other banks (which we are able to identify as banks with observably 
higher opportunity costs) chose to issue less than their legal maxima. Thus, the puzzle of 
national bank note issuance turns out to be largely an artifact of aggregation error.  
We develop a data set linking individual bank note issuing behavior, the specific 
legal constraints on note issuing faced by each bank, and the profitability of bank lending. 
Our dataset consists of individual bank data for all reporting national banks in 1880 and 
1900. Our measures of the opportunities for lending include banks’ characteristics as well 
as characteristics of the economic environment (county or state) in which banks operated.   
Section II models the equilibrium supply and demand for national bank notes, and 
describes the legal limits on note supply. Section III reviews our data and summarizes the 
note issuing behavior of national banks in 1880 and 1900. Section IV tests and rejects 
Cagan’s (1965) redemption risk theory of underissuance. Section V documents and 
explains the absence of pure note issuing “arbitrage” strategies by national banks; that is, 
we show why national banks did not enter solely with the purpose of issuing notes. 
Section VI provides Tobit regression analysis of the extent of individual bank note issues 
relative to their maximum potential level in 1880 and 1900. The results lend support to 
James’ opportunity cost theory of note issuing. Section VII analyzes patterns of entry and 
exit by national banks between 1880 and 1900. Entry and exit patterns confirm the 
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findings in Sections V and VI, which indicate that note issuing was not a primary profit 
center in U.S. banking. Section VIII concludes. Overall, we find that a combination of 
legal restrictions on maximum note issuing and banks’ opportunity costs explain the 
extent of bank note issuing in a manner consistent with bank profit maximization. 
 
II. Supply and Demand for National Bank Notes 
The quantity of national bank notes in circulation should be determined by supply 
and demand in the market for bank notes.  While there were legislative limits placed on 
the aggregate quantity of notes outstanding and on the geographic distribution of note 
issuing, those aggregate limits were never binding constraints on individual bank 
issuance.  Prior to 1874, whenever the amount of notes came close to reaching the 
maximum allowable supply, the law was changed to accommodate more note issues.  In 
1874, the law was changed to remove any aggregate limits on note issues, although the 
limited supply of U.S. Treasury bonds (to serve as 111% collateral for note issues) 
effectively placed a non-binding upper bound on the potential supply of notes. 
National bank notes were essentially perfect substitutes for transactions purposes 
with U.S. notes (greenbacks) and coins, and traded at par with those alternative 
transacting media (except briefly during 1873, when the special value to banks of holding 
greenbacks, which were a legal reserve currency, led their value to temporarily exceed 
that of bank notes – see Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 21-2).  National bank notes 
and greenbacks were always inframarginal sources of transacting media whose quantity 
was set by suppliers and who were unresponsive to shifts in the demand for transacting 
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media; increases in demand for transacting media on the margin were met by changes in 
the supply of specie currency (see Calomiris 1988, 1994, Hetherington 1990).  
Equilibrium in international markets under the classical gold standard 
simultaneously determined gold-denominated interest rates and specie flows to 
equilibrate the markets for goods and money (Calomiris and Hubbard 1996). The supply 
of national bank notes adjusted endogenously to the level of interest rates set in the 
money market.  Calomiris (1988, 1994) shows that (so long as the supply of Treasury 
bonds to back national bank notes was greater than the amount demanded for that 
purpose) the supply of national bank notes for banks that were not at a corner solution 
should have been determined by (a) the yield on government bonds, (b) the profitability 
of bank lending, and (c) the tax rate charged on national bank note issues.  The supply of 
notes, in this model, is set by the profit-maximizing choices of national banks about 
whether to allocate marginal capital toward (a) the business of deposit taking and lending 
or (b) the business of producing national bank notes, backed by government bond 
purchases.  In any empirical model of cross-sectional differences in note issuance (in 
particular, for our sample of national banks in 1880) the profitability of lending is the 
primary influence that should predict cross-sectional differences in the propensity to issue 
notes, since the taxation rate and market yield on bonds are the same for all banks.  
Of course, this model does not apply on the margin to banks that are at a corner 
solution, either because of legal limits on maximum issues that require them to issue less 
than they would like, or legal limits on minimum issues that require them to issue more 
than they would like. Among banks issuing the maximum permissible amount of notes, 
cross-sectional variation in bank characteristics should have no explanatory power for 
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marginal note issuing, although those cross-sectional characteristics should help explain 
which banks are at a corner solution. Thus, before applying the model to individual bank 
data, one must take account of the various limits on note issuing that might constrain 
banks to operate at a corner solution. 
Prior to 1882, the limits on note issues relating to capital for national banks were a 
complex function of the capital levels and bond holdings of banks, and these limits varied 
by the size of the bank and (due to grandfathering) by the date the bank was chartered. 
These constraints are summarized in Table 1, and are based on National Monetary 
Commission (1910).  A bank chartered before March 1865 could not issue notes in 
excess of 90% of the bank’s paid in capital. A bank chartered from March 1865 through 
July 1870 was governed by the following limits on note issue relative to capital: A bank 
with capital less than $500,000 could issue up to 90% of capital; a bank with capital of 
between $500,000 and $1,000,000 could issue up to 80% of capital; a bank with capital 
of between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000 could issue up to 75% of capital; and a bank with 
capital in excess of $3,000,000 could issue up to 60% of capital.  Banks chartered after 
July 12, 1870 were governed by the following limits: No bank could issue more than 
$500,000 in notes; banks with capital less than $500,000 could issue up to 90% of 
capital; and banks with capital between $500,000 and $625,000 could issue up to 80% of 
capital.  In 1882, those requirements were supplanted by a single measure of maximum 
note issue of 90% capital for all banks. In 1900 that restriction was raised to 100% of 
capital. (The complexity of regulations on the maximum preceding 1882 is the primary 
reason why previous literature has focused nearly exclusively on the period after that 
year.) National banks that also had outstanding state bank issues (dating from the time 
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before they became national banks) had to include those notes in any measure of total 
permissible note issues.  
All banks also faced an effective minimum note issuing requirement, since all 
national banks were required to maintain government bond holdings of at least $30,000 
or an amount equal to one third of bank capital, whichever was higher. (That requirement 
was reduced to 25% of capital for banks with capital less than $150,000 in 1882.) To the 
extent that a bank was constrained to hold the minimum amount of government bonds, 
issuing notes backed by those bonds would have always been profitable (Hetherington 
1990).  As we shall show below, these ceilings and floors on permissible note issues were 
often binding on individual banks. 
 
III. Data on Individual Banks 
Our dataset consists of hand-collected information on 2,094 national banks in 
1880, and 3,879 national banks in 1900. We also collected data about the states and 
counties in which those banks resided. Data on counties are available only for decadal 
census dates. We chose 1880 as a starting date for several reasons. First, by 1880, it is 
reasonable to assume that banks had adjusted to the effects of the changes on note issuing 
limits in 1874.  Second, in January 1879 the U.S. resumed convertibility of dollars into 
gold, an event that had been anticipated for several years prior to that time (Calomiris 
1988). Analyzing note supply after resumption of convertibility simplifies the discussion 
by permitting one to abstract from various complications associated with deflationary 
expectations during the 1870s (Calomiris 1988). Third, as the above quotation from 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) shows, they regard the underissuance of national bank 
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notes during the periods before 1884 and after 1891 as especially puzzling. According to 
Cagan (1965, p. 93), profitability on note issuing rose during the 1890s and accelerated as 
the result of the Gold Standard Act of March 1900. Like 1880, 1900 was a time of 
relatively high profitability from note issuing; both years have been viewed by previous 
scholars as times of puzzling underissuance of profitable national bank notes. 
The dependent variable we analyze is the extent to which banks issued their 
maximum permissible amount of national bank notes. Specifically, the dependent 
variable, Issue Propensity (IP), is defined as:  
 
IP =   (Actual Notes – Minimum Required Issuance) /  
(Maximum Permissible Notes – Minimum Required Issuance) 
 
  Table 2 provides definitions of all the variables used in this study. Table 3 
provides summary statistics. As shown in Table 3, in 1880 the median value of IP is 
0.9889 and the mean is 0.8043. Fully 75% of national banks in 1880 have values of IP 
greater than 0.7460. We assume that banks with IP greater than 98% are effectively at 
their maximum amount of note issue (given potential rounding effects from the minimum 
denomination of bond issues and random variation in outstanding notes associated with 
redemptions). Thus, we assign all banks with a value of IP greater than or equal to 0.98 a 
truncated value of IP equal to 0.98. Similarly, we assign banks with a value of IP less 
than 0.02 a truncated value of IP equal to 0.02. Our truncated measure of IP, therefore, 
varies between 0.02 and 0.98.
3
                                                 
3 In 1880, 5 banks did not issue any notes at all. Another 117 banks issued fewer than supported by the 
minimum required bond holdings. We classify all of these banks as minimum issuers. In 1900, 181 banks 
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Using 0.98 as our truncated measure of maximum note issuance, 61% of national 
banks in 1880 were issuing the maximum amount of notes permitted.  In other words, 
61% of national banks were at a maximum corner solution in their issuing of national 
bank notes. Another 7% of national banks in 1880 were at a minimum corner solution 
(with a truncated value of IP equal to 0.02). The remaining 32% of national banks in 
1880 had IP values between the truncated minimum and maximum values. Figure 1 plots 
a histogram of the distribution of the truncated value of IP for all banks in 1880. Figure 2 
plots a histogram of IP for the 32% of national banks that were neither at the maximum 
nor at the minimum in 1880. 
Table 3 shows that the distribution of IP changed considerably by 1900. In 1900 
the median value of IP is 0.0913 and the mean is 0.2919. Only 25% of national banks in 
1900 have values of IP greater than 0.7600. Again using 0.02 as our truncated measure of 
minimum note issuance, 49% of national banks in 1900 were issuing the minimum 
amount of notes permitted.  In other words, 49% of national banks were at a minimum 
corner solution in their issuing of national bank notes. Another 21% of national banks in 
1990 were at a maximum corner solution (with a truncated value of IP equal to 0.98). The 
remaining 30% of national banks in 1900 had IP values between the truncated minimum 
and maximum values. Figure 3 plots a histogram of the distribution of the truncated value 
of IP for all banks in 1900. Figure 4 plots a histogram of IP for the 30% of national banks 
that were neither at the maximum nor at the minimum in 1900. 
                                                                                                                                                 
did not issue any notes at all. Another 948 banks issued less than the minimum required bond holdings 
suggest. We also classify these banks as minimum issuers. In 1880, 67 banks issue at levels slightly above 
their statutory maximum. In 1900, 5 banks slightly exceeded the maximum issue allowed. We classify all 
72 of these banks as maximum issuers. In most instances, exceptional cases are explicable in terms of some 
combination of the following factors: small size, recent startup, or preexisting state bank note issues that 
the regulators apparently chose to ignore. 
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Figure 5 plots the geographical distribution of national banks in 1880 and 1900 
according to whether they were minimum issuers, maximum issuers, or other issuers 
(which we call “discretionary” issuers). We divide the United States into six regions: the 
Middle Atlantic (MIDATL), the Midwest (MIDWEST), the South (SOUTH), Appalachia 
(APPAL), the West (WEST), and the Northeast (EAST). Given the high physical costs of 
operating banks in cities, and potentially more profitable lending opportunities there, we 
expected major cities’ national banks to display less propensity to issue bank notes. 
Banks in New York City (NYC) are separately considered. We also consider the more 
general category of urban (URBAN) banks (defined as banks located in the major cities 
of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, or San Francisco).  
Figure 5 shows that there were average differences across regions in IP in 1880, 
and that those differences also appear in 1900. In each of these years, New England, the 
Middle Atlantic, and Appalachia had higher proportions of banks at the maximum and 
lower proportions at the minimum than banks in the corresponding year located in the 
South, West, and Midwest. Interestingly, urban banks, and especially NYC banks, had 
much lower proportions of maximum issuers, and much higher proportions of minimum 
issuers than average banks in most regions of the country.  
The evidence on regional variation in note issuance is consistent with James’ 
(1978) opportunity cost explanation for cross-sectional differences in note issuance, but it 
is conceivable that other factors (e.g., regional variation in redemption risks, and their 
associated costs) could also explain these patterns. Thus, before returning to an empirical 
investigation of the James hypothesis, we first investigate the extent to which redemption 
risk might explain cross-sectional variation in note issuance. 
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IV. Cagan’s Redemption Risk Theory of Underissuance 
  Cagan (1965, p. 95) specifically points to redemption risk as the most likely 
explanation for the low issuance of national bank notes: 
  The slow expansion [of national bank notes] suggests that national  
banks waited until it seemed certain that no reason to withdraw the notes 
would arise in the near future. Why a withdrawal need be feared, however, 
is not clear. 
Cagan (p. 89) argued that the amount national banks held on deposit at the Treasury in 
excess of the 5% minimum required redemption fund likely reflected, at least in part, a 
form of precautionary reserve holdings, which should be included in the cost of issuing 
notes.  More generally, advocates of hidden redemption costs as the solution to the 
national bank note issuance puzzle have focused on the risks of unpredictable 
redemption.   
As Cagan recognized, it is not obvious that redemption risk should have been 
significant in practice. National banks could pay out to the public each other’s notes 
received from the public, and notes were default risk-free, thus, it is not clear why notes 
would be presented at the Treasury or at any national bank, for redemption rather than 
continue to circulate among banks and the public at par (except for reasons of wear and 
tear).
4 Furthermore, national banks could instruct the Treasury to sell bonds on deposit at 
the Treasury to pay for redemption, or borrow in the interbank market (from a bank that 
could take funds to the Treasury as needed) to finance redemption on short notice. To the 
extent that transportation costs and idle notes may have represented hidden redemption 
                                                 
4 Indeed, Cagan and Schwartz (1991) provide detailed criticisms of various arguments advanced 
by other authors in support of the idea that redemption costs were significant. Cagan and 
Schwartz also note (p. 303) that, circa 1900, notes were redeemed on average only once every 32 
months. 
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costs, the Treasury routinely accepted notes for redemption at subtreasury offices located 
in large reserve cities.
5 Even if notes could not be reissued quickly after being returned 
from the Treasury, banks could still invest them in the interbank deposit market, which 
yielded about 2% throughout our period.  
  Cagan’s discussion suggests a straightforward test of the proposition that the costs 
of unpredictable redemption were important, and that the 5% minimum redemption fund 
did not adequately eliminate the risk of redemption. If unpredictable redemption costs 
were important, then national banks would have maintained excess reserves on deposit at 
the Treasury (or perhaps in their vaults) to ensure their ability to redeem notes on 
demand.  Because the size of excess reserves maintained at the Treasury and in bank 
vaults by each national bank is observable, one can test whether national banks held 
precautionary balances against note issues, and whether the need for excess reserves to 
mitigate the costs of redemption risk can explain regional differences in the propensity to 
issue notes.  
  The first thing to note about national banks’ excess balances at the Treasury is 
that they were quite small. In 1880, total excess reserves at the Treasury were 0.61% of 
total outstanding national bank notes. In 1900, they were 0.75% of national bank notes. 
The cross sectional standard error of the ratio of excess treasury reserves to national bank 
notes outstanding was 0.0010627 in 1880 and 0.0012327 in 1900. Clearly, the average 
precautionary demand for excess reserves at the Treasury to mitigate the risk of sudden 
redemption was small. 
                                                 
5 Cagan and Schwartz (1991) cite estimates that some 85% to 90% of banks whose notes were 
redeemed were located in those large reserve cities (p. 300). 
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  We employ regression analysis to test for a relationship between the scale of bank 
note issue and the amount of excess reserves. If banks were concerned about redemption 
risk, and if the desired excess reserve ratio is a constant fraction of notes outstanding 
(after controlling for regional differences and other bank characteristics), then banks with 
larger amounts of notes should hold larger amounts of excess reserves.  
  Table 4 presents simple regression analysis of narrow reserves held at the 
Treasury (since Cagan emphasized that component) as a ratio of total bank liabilities 
(assets minus net worth), which we call TER, and the ratio of excess cash reserves 
(including funds at the Treasury as well as those in the bank’s vault) relative to total bank 
liabilities, which we call NER, for both 1880 and 1900. The model of the determinants of 
reserve demand is taken from Calomiris and Mason (2004).  
  The excess reserve demand regressions measure the relationship between excess 
reserve holdings and various bank characteristics. Characteristics include bank balance 
sheet characteristics and bank location characteristics. Location is captured both by 
regional indicators, and by indicators that capture whether the bank is located in a 
“reserve city” or a “central reserve city”. Banks located in reserve cities or central reserve 
cities faced different regulatory requirements for deposits, and also different business 
opportunities, which may have affected their demands for reserves. 
Bank balance sheet characteristics include bank leverage (total liabilities relative 
to total assets, TLTA), the total amount of bank liabilities (log of total liabilities, LNTL), 
and various measures of the mix of liabilities, the mix of assets, and the location of the 
bank. Economies of scale in transactions demand for reserves is a common feature of all 
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empirical money demand models (Baumol 1952, Tobin 1956, Miller and Orr 1966) and 
implies a negative relationship between total liabilities and the demand for reserves.  
Our measures of liability mix allow the demand for reserves to depend on liability 
composition, which is likely to reflect differences in the volatility of withdrawals or 
redemptions (as modeled in Miller and Orr 1966). These variables include the ratio of 
bank notes relative to total liabilities (NTL), its square, NTLSQ (to allow for non-
linearity in this effect), and measures of deposit mix.  Deposits are divided into three 
categories: U.S. government deposits, interbank deposits, and deposits of the public. The 
ratios of U.S. government deposits to total deposits is USDTD, and the ratio of interbank 
deposits to total deposits is IBDTD. The ratio of public deposits to total deposits is the 
omitted category of deposits.  
We also include the ratio of loans and discounts relative to securities (after 
omitting U.S. government securities held as backing for bank notes), which we call 
LOANRAT. LOANRAT can be thought of as a measure of the attractiveness of bank 
lending opportunities as reflected in banks’ asset mix decisions. Calomiris and Wilson 
(2004) show that superior lending opportunities result in lower reserve demand, ceteris 
paribus. 
Our focus here is on the relationship between increases in bank notes and the 
demand for excess reserves. Cagan’s precautionary reserve-demand hypothesis implies 
that an increase in the total amount of national bank notes issued by the bank should 
result in an increase in excess reserve holdings of the issuing bank.  
The regressions in Table 4 show that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of national bank notes and the level of excess cash 
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reserves (measured either by TER or NER). Banks that issued larger amounts of notes, 
ceteris paribus, did not hold larger amounts of excess cash reserves. Furthermore, with 
the exception of the South, there is no evidence of regional variation in the target excess 
reserve ratio of reserves held at the Treasury (TER). There is some evidence of regional 
variation in NER, but that variation is not consistent over time, and it does not correspond 
with the regional variation in note issuing described by James or by Figure 5. We 
conclude that narrowly defined excess cash reserves (whether held at the Treasury or in 
the bank vault) were generally unrelated to bank note issue.  That evidence suggests that 
banks believed that their 5% minimum redemption fund was more than adequate to 
handle redemption risks from note issuance. Consequently, we conclude that the 
hypothesized costly maintenance of cash balances to mitigate redemption risk cannot 
explain the puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes.  
In Table 5, we broaden our definition of excess reserves to include total reserves 
(specie, legal tender, deposits at the Treasury, plus deposits held at other banks) minus 
the amount of required reserves (either at the bank or at the Treasury), relative to total 
liabilities, which we call BER. We find that broadly defined reserve holdings are 
negatively related to note issue, and that this relationship is statistically significant.   
It is important to remember that the relationship between notes and excess 
reserves in Tables 4 and 5 is not univariate. As noted before, expanding the bank size to 
increase note issuance implies not only an additional effect through NTLSQ, but also a 
commensurate (111%) increase in assets and liabilities. Hence, Table 6 presents the total 
marginal effects on excess reserves of a $100,000 increase in bank size brought about by 
increasing note issuance accounting for the appropriate changes in TLTA, LNTL, NTL, 
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and NTLSQ at the variable means. The resulting marginal effect of increased note issue 
is negative for all classes of reserves in Table 6, and is most negative for the broadest 
class of reserves estimated in Table 5. Hence, it appears that note redemption was not a 
risk that was magnified by increased note issue.  
The results in Table 5 not only contradict the redemption risk hypothesis, they 
suggest a significant reduction in reserve management costs from issuing notes for the 
average bank. We interpret this result as reflecting a complementarity (economy of 
scope) between, on the one hand, note issuing, and on the other hand, deposit taking and 
lending, which resulted from the fact that the 5% minimum cash reserve requirement on 
notes was more than the amount warranted by actual redemption risk on notes. Under that 
hypothesis, note-issuing banks could economize on the costs of maintaining desired 
reserves associated with deposit taking and lending (motivated, for example, by portfolio 
risk reduction) because the unwarranted high required reserves against notes could be 
applied toward reducing the amount of excess reserves needed in the deposit taking and 
lending arm of the bank. In other words, taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 
indicate that redemption risks for notes were unusually low, and were more than 
adequately dealt with by the minimum cash reserves held at the Treasury. Excessive 
required reserves on note issues, however, reduced the demand for excess reserves for 
other purposes. The economies of scope in reserve management also help to explain why 
national banks combined deposit taking and note issuing, rather than specialize in note 
issuing, since combining the two reduced the cost of note issuing (more on this point in 
Section V below). 
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V. The Absence of Pure Arbitrage Strategies 
The fact that many banks issued the maximum permissible amount of notes in 
1880 and 1900 presents one with two related puzzles of underissuance. First, one must 
explain why some banks in existence did not issue the maximum amount of notes that 
they could (we return to that question in Section VI below). Second, one must also 
explain the lack of entry by pure “arbitragers” into the note issuing business. That second 
question is addressed here. 
If note issuing were profitable, and if existing banks willing to issue notes had 
already issued their legal maximum or had deployed their equity capital in the pursuit of 
profitable alternative opportunities, one might still expect bank entry by new, purely note 
issuing bankers. The scarcity of financial or human capital in the banking industry (which 
was already being employed in other banks) would not constrain such investors, since 
they had no need for knowledge of the businesses of lending and deposit taking. We term 
entry by investors to establish a wholly note issuing national bank a “pure arbitrage” 
strategy for issuing notes. In essence, such an arbitrage strategy would be a means of 
taking advantage of an interest rate subsidy on “margin loans” from the government for 
the purpose of purchasing government bonds.  
Interestingly, no national banks pursued this pure arbitrage strategy. As shown in 
Table 7, which summarizes data on the ten banks in 1880 that had the lowest ratios of 
assets other than government bonds relative to total assets (OTHASS) and the ten banks 
in 1880 that had the lowest ratios of deposits to assets (DEPASS), all national banks were 
involved in lending/investment and deposit taking to some degree. For example, 
Montpelier National Bank, which maintained the lowest OTHASS ratio, had an OTHASS 
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ratio of 31.6% and a DEPASS ratio of 50.8%.  Casco National Bank, which maintained 
the lowest DEPASS ratio, had an OTHASS ratio of 97.2% and a DEPASS ratio of 
33.2%. Results for 1900 (not reported here) are similar to those reported in Table 7, 
although two banks in 1900 displayed low DEPASS ratios of 5.5% and 5.6%. But those 
two banks displayed OTHASS ratios of 52.7% and 53.7%, respectively. 
When one considers the practical obstacles to pursuing a profitable pure arbitrage 
strategy, it is not surprising that no national banks did so. A bank in 1880 establishing 
itself solely to issue notes would have only pursued one of two strategies (summarized, 
respectively, in Figures 6 and 7). The first strategy (illustrated in Figure 6) – to issue the 
maximum amount of notes, equal to $500,000 – implied a required capital investment of 
$625,000 in initial equity capital and an additional $125,000 in surplus capital, for a total 
equity investment of $750,000.
6  The bank would also have been required to maintain a 
$25,000 redemption fund at the Treasury. The remaining $1,225,000 could be held in 
government bonds. Long-term government bonds yielded roughly 3.5% in 1880.
7 The 
pre-tax annual earnings on these bonds would have been $42,875. The bank also had to 
pay a tax equal to one percent of its outstanding national bank notes, or $5,000. Thus, 
even if the bank faced no physical costs of operating, its after-tax earnings would equal 
$37,875, implying a return on equity capital of 5.05%.   
A second possible strategy for 1880 is summarized in Figure 7. Here the bank 
issues fewer notes ($449,999) in order to maintain paid in capital just below $500,000, 
                                                 
6 The initial capital investment is necessary to satisfy the regulation that notes must be less than 
80% of capital, if capital is above $500,000. The surplus capital requirement is set according to 
the requirements of Sections 33 and 38 of the National Bank Act of June 3, 1864, which requires 
that banks accumulate and retain surplus equal to 20% of paid in capital. 
7 According to Homer and Sylla (1991), p. 316, in 1880, U.S. government bonds maturing in 
1891 had a yield to maturity of 3.45%, and U.S. government bonds maturing in 1907 had a yield 
to maturity of 3.63%. 
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and thus be able to issue 90% of its capital in notes (as opposed to only 80% of capital). 
Assuming zero operating expenses, this bank has after-tax earnings of $31,463, and a 
return on equity of 5.24%.  
In 1900, long-term Treasury bond yields were much lower, ranging from 1.7% to 
2.12%, implying substantially lower returns on equity from a pure arbitrage strategy.
8 
Assuming a Treasury bond yield of 2% for 1900, and using the same methods for 
computing profitability as in Figures 6 and 7, the banks issuing $500,000 and $449,999 in 
notes, respectively, would earn returns on equity of 2.6% and 2.8%.  
This method for computing returns on equity results in values that are lower than 
those described by Cagan or Friedman and Schwartz, but they are still unrealistically 
high. A national bank would have undoubtedly had some minimal costs of operation, 
even if it did not engage in lending or deposit taking. National banking law required at 
least five members of the board of directors (who would have to meet and be 
compensated for their time), and the hiring of employees (a president, vice president, and 
cashier), the regular filing of accounts, the maintenance of a headquarters, and regular 
bank examinations paid for by the national bank being examined. Section 54 of the Bank 
Act of 1864 requires that examiners be compensated at the rate of $5 a day, plus $2 per 
25 miles traveled on their way to the bank, all billed to the bank. We conservatively 
estimate the physical costs of running a bare bones bank (rent, maintenance costs, wages, 
examination fees, and accounting costs) at roughly $1,000 per year. That estimate 
assumes that directors and officers serve at no cost, assumes a wage cost of $750 per year 
(the estimated cost of employing a cashier to keep the bank’s premises, manage its 
accounts, and meet with the examiner, assuming that the cashier is paid $2.50 per day), 
                                                 
8 Homer and Sylla (1991), p. 343. 
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and rental, maintenance, and examination costs of an additional $250 per year.  We add 
to those costs the Comptroller’s initial redemption cost estimates in the range of $62.50 
per $100,000 of notes, which Goodhart and others argued rose considerably due to 
seasonal fluctuations in demand for monetary medium. Under these assumptions, total 
operating costs for the banks operating in 1880, described in Figures 6 and 7, equal 
$1,313 and $1,281, respectively. Those costs imply returns on equity of 4.87% and 
5.03%, respectively. For the analogous banks operating in 1900, the implied returns on 
equity would be 2.43% and 2.54%, respectively. Our estimates of physical costs are very 
conservative, which may explain why the implied returns on equity are still above the 
Comptroller’s miniscule estimates of returns to note issuance of 50-175 basis points in 
1880 (Annual Report, p. 8). Nevertheless, these returns are quite modest, especially 
considering the fact that note issuing did imply substantial interest rate risk.
9
Another way to think about the profit from the pure arbitrage strategy, which 
takes into account interest rate risk, is to compare it to a similarly leveraged purchase of 
government bonds. For example, assume that a state-chartered bank had established itself 
purely with the intent of investing in government bonds, and had borrowed on the 
interbank deposit market to fund that investment, and that it chose to maintain the same 
balance sheet amounts as in Figures 6 and 7, but substituted interbank deposits for 
national bank notes as a source of finance. That state-chartered bank would have been in 
a somewhat inferior position to a national bank pursuing a pure arbitrage strategy for two 
reasons: (1) the interest cost on interbank deposits is greater than the cost of finance from 
bank notes (which is just the one percent tax on note issues), and (2) the national bank 
does not bear as much interest rate risk as the state-chartered bank, since increases in 
                                                 
9 For further discussion of interest rate risk, see Kuehlwein (1992). 
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interest rates have no effect on the required return paid on national bank notes (which are 
always zero).  
Interbank deposit funding imposes an interest cost of roughly 2% during our time 
period.
10  Thus, abstracting from interest rate risk differences, the annual after-tax 
national bank “subsidy” for its zero-interest margin loan from the government for 
investing in government bonds would have been roughly one percent of the amount of 
notes issued ($5,000 in the first example, and $4,500 in the second example).  
The difference in interest rate risk can be captured by considering the difference 
in the sensitivity of bank equity to variation in the yields on long-term bonds for the two 
hypothetical banks. For concreteness, assume that both the national and state-chartered 
hypothetical banks had a Macaulay duration of assets of 10 years (reflecting their 
holdings of government bonds with average maturities in excess of 10 years). 
Alternatively, assume that the arbitragers expected to operate the banks for 10 years and 
then liquidate them, implying a duration on bank notes of 10 years.
11 Assume that 
interbank deposits used to finance the state-chartered bank had a duration of ninety days 
and assume (to be consistent with the examples in Figures 6 and 7) that the ratio of debt 
to assets was 0.4. In a simple, one-factor model of interest rate risk, the sensitivity 
(percentage decline) of bank equity value resulting from a one percent rise in interest 
rates for the banks we consider is given by the following equation:  
                                                 
10 John James (1976, p. 200) writes: “…explicit payment of interest was becoming a pervasive 
practice in New York by the late 1880s, and at that time also the rate of interest stabilized at 2 
percent…” 
11 Alternatively, one could assume an indefinite maturity of bank notes, if the founders of the 
bank could have sold their stock in the bank to others upon their retirement. In the event, changes 
in monetary regime rules brought an end to the license to issue national bank notes, and this was a 
risk that arguably was known in advance. Thus, we think a 10-year expectation for the operation 
of the national bank note issuing license is reasonable. Reasonable variation in that assumption 
will not change our conclusions.  
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DK  = A/K [DA – (L/A) DL].  
Under the above assumptions, the values of DK for the national and state-chartered banks 
would be as follows: For the national bank, DK = 1.67 [10 - (0.4)10] = 10. For the state-
chartered bank, DK = 1.67 [10 – (0.4)(0.25)] = 16.53. 
  How much would this difference in interest rate risk have mattered for the value 
of the national bank? Judging from the small yield differences in 1880 on government 
bonds with maturity dates of 1891 and 1907 (the first of which had a duration less than 
10 years, and the second of which had a duration greater than 17 years), the market did 
not view the added risk as very great. According to Homer and Sylla (1991, p. 316), in 
1880, U.S. government bonds maturing in 1891 had a yield to maturity of 3.45%, and 
U.S. government bonds maturing in 1907 had a yield to maturity of 3.63%, implying a 
difference of 18 basis points.
12 We conservatively estimate the value of the reduced risk 
to the national bank at roughly 20 basis points of return on equity per year. In the 
example in Figure 6, for 1880 that would amount to $1,500 of added annual value, 
bringing the total subsidy to a pure arbitrager (before expenses) of $6,500 per year. In the 
example in Figure 7, for 1880 the 20 basis point premium would add $1,200 of added 
annual value, raising the total subsidy (before expenses) to $5,700 per year. The 
analogous additions for 1900 would be smaller. 
  Thus, around 1880, the annual gain (gross of physical expenses) from pursuing 
the pure arbitrage strategy, taking into account the value from interest payments savings 
and reduced interest rate risk, was roughly $6,500 on an equity investment of $750,000, 
or $5,700 on an equity investment of $600,000 – in both cases, less than one percent of 
                                                 
12 The difference for 1900 was even smaller. The Treasury bond maturing in 1907 had a yield of 
1.70%, while the bond maturing in 1925 had a yield of 1.82% (Homer and Sylla 1991, p. 343). 
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equity invested.  The gain from the subsidy net of physical expenses would have been 
substantially lower, and possibly negative. In other words, the gain from using a national 
bank charter as a vehicle for investing in U.S. government securities was nearly zero, and 
perhaps negative, after one takes into account physical costs and the cost of risk. By 
1900, that gain was even smaller. 
In summary, as an empirical matter, banks did not pursue the pure arbitrage 
strategy. When one considers the limitations on leverage from the banking regulations, 
the taxes on note issues, and the cost of operating even a “bare bones” national bank, it is 
not surprising that pure arbitrage remained a hypothetical opportunity.  Note issuance 
was not profitable as a stand-alone strategy for a bank; note issuing was only profitable 
when combined with lending and deposit taking. Note issuing was not the primary profit 
center for a national bank. Note issuing, by itself, was not a viable business; it depended 
for its profitability on economies of scope between note issuing and other banking 
functions due to sharing physical costs of operating and diversifying risks. The empirical 
work in Section VII further confirms that note issuing was of small and declining 
profitability over time, as indicated by the low propensity to issue notes by banks 
entering  between 1880 and 1900. 
 
VI. Regression Analysis 
We turn to regression analysis of our truncated measure of IP.  We consider 
whether observable differences in the attributes of issuers related to the opportunity cost 
of issuing notes (i.e., lending profitability) explain their propensities to issue notes. As we 
discussed above, and as James (1978) hypothesized, a bank’s opportunities other than 
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note issuing should have been important determinants of IP. Our measures of bank 
opportunity costs, which we expect to be negatively associated with IP, take account of a 
variety of those potentially relevant factors.   
First, as a measure of lending opportunities we include a measure of asset returns 
– for assets other than U.S. Treasury securities held to secure note circulation – of banks 
in the state in which the national bank is located, as one measure of bank profitability 
(bank-level or county-level data on banks’ revenues and costs are not available).  ROAL 
is constructed by adjusting state-level ROA to remove the effect of interest earned on 
U.S. Treasuries securing note circulation, using data on that year’s Treasury yields and 
data on state-level note circulation to calculate the amount of Treasury securities backing 
note issues. Of course, ROAL is a noisy indicator of lending opportunities for individual 
banks because it is a state-level aggregate and also because it fails to capture dynamic 
growth or contraction in expected loan opportunities, which would be relevant to bank 
decisions about allocating capital between note production and lending. Thus, as 
additional bank-level proxies, we also consider two other measures.  
We include the individual bank’s ratio of loans and discounts relative to its 
holdings of securities (other than the U.S. Treasury bonds held to secure note circulation). 
Banks with superior lending opportunities should maintain a higher LOANRAT. This 
measure captures the portfolio allocation decisions of each bank, and takes into account 
forward looking expectations of loan profitability. 
Finally, we include additional measures of opportunity cost related to the growth 
and profitability of agriculture and manufacturing within the county (or counties) in 
which the bank located, weighted by the importance of those sectors in the county 
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economy. For 1880 and 1900, both decadal census years, data on the amount of capital in 
manufacturing, and on the amount of capital in agriculture, are available. These variables 
can be used to measure the relative importance (weight) of each of the two sectors in the 
local county economy, and also the growth rate of capital for the previous ten year period 
prior to each of 1880 and 1900. The variables WDFK and WDMK measure the weighted 
growth in farm and manufacturing capital within the county (or counties) in which the 
bank is located, both for the 1880 and 1900. Additionally, for 1900, census data are also 
available on the profitability of the manufacturing sector. For 1900, we include weighted 
return on capital assets in manufacturing (WROAM) instead of WDMK as an alternative 
measure of manufacturing profitability. 
We also include various control variables in our analysis related to the size, age, 
and urban location of banks. Size is defined as asset size (SIZE) and bank age (AGE) is 
defined as years since its national bank charter.  The relationships between IP and bank 
size and age are potentially complex. Ceteris paribus, because older banks were initially 
allowed different maximum issue sizes, their IPs could be lower (because, ceteris paribus, 
they are less likely to be constrained in their desired amounts of issues). Larger banks, 
ceteris paribus, could have higher IP because they are more likely to be constrained by 
the maximum issuance limit. But those implications about ceteris paribus associations 
may not hold true in measured associations between IP and size and age variables 
because size and age might be associated with marginal lending opportunities (more on 
this point in Section VII below). Older and larger banks might have surplus capital 
relative to new lending opportunities, for example, which could lead to a higher value of 
IP. Thus, we include SIZE, AGE, and SIZExAGE as controls, since all three may be 
  26 
relevant for predicting note issuing propensity, although we recognize that there are 
multiple interpretations of the measured effects associated with these variables. 
We also include separate indicator variables to control for any special 
characteristics of banks located in New York City (NYC), and for banks located in other 
major cities listed above (URBAN).  
In Tables 8 and 9 (for national banks in 1880 and 1900, respectively) we report 
Tobit regressions, which take into account the truncations that result from minimum and 
maximum note issuing rules, and which measure the effects of opportunity cost and 
control variables. For each year, we report specifications that alternately include or 
exclude regional indicator variables. We begin with regressions that exclude all the 
opportunity cost variables, but include regional indicators (a regression that is analogous 
to James’s 1978 results). For 1880, we report three regressions – (1) with regional 
indicators but without opportunity costs, (2) without regional indicators but with 
opportunity costs, and (3) with both regional indicators and opportunity costs.  For 1900, 
we report four regressions, since we have two alternative measures of county-level 
profitability of manufacturing (WDMK and WROAM).    
The results are broadly consistent with one another and with our hypothesized 
opportunity cost effects. They indicate substantial variation in the propensity to issue 
national bank notes that is traceable to county, state, and bank-specific characteristics 
related to the profitability of lending. State-level ROAL enters negatively, but it is not 
typically statistically significant. Bank-level LOANRAT enters negatively and 
significantly. County-level WDFK enters negatively and significantly in 1880, but is less 
significant in 1900. WDMK enters negatively and insignificantly for 1880 and 1900, but 
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the alternative measure of manufacturing profitability (WROAM) enters negatively and 
significantly in 1900 (the only year for which these data are available). 
It is also interesting to note that the effect of the regional indicator variables for 
MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST, remain negative and statistically significant in the 
presence of the opportunity cost variables, which indicates that our measures of 
opportunity cost still do not capture all of the important regional influences on note 
issuing.  
Controls for SIZE, AGE, and SIZExAGE generally are significant and remain 
significant in the presence of regional indicator variables. NYC and URBAN enter 
negatively and sometimes significantly. Those effects may also indicate an opportunity 
cost effect, since banks in cities may have had special lending opportunities that reduced 
their propensity to issue notes. 
Our results provide support for James’ (1978) view that opportunity costs of 
lending varied across banks and explain variation in the propensity to issue notes. Many 
banks (with low lending opportunity costs) were at a corner solution with respect to note 
issuing. Other banks (with high lending opportunity costs) issued less than the maximum 
permissible amount of notes.  
 
VII. Entry, Exit, and Bank Note Issuance 
The declining propensity to issue notes over time was reinforced by the exit of 
high note issuers and the entry of low note issuers. Furthermore, the tendency for banks 
in the MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST to issue fewer bank notes in 1880 and 1900 was 
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true of banks that survived the entire period, as well as those that entered between 1880 
and 1900.  
Figure 8a illustrates that of the many national banks that entered the industry 
between 1880 and 1900, only 17% of those that entered (411 of 2,381 entering banks) 
chose a maximum note issue strategy while a full 55% (1,300 of 2,381) chose to issue at 
the minimum. Furthermore, Figure 8b shows that 59% of those exiting the industry 
during the period (275 out of 470 exiting banks) were maximum issuers, while only 10% 
(46 of 470) were minimum issuers. Figure 5 illustrates that the majority of entry was in 
the regions of low note issue – the MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST – where issuance 
was already low. Because entering banks predominantly issued at the minimum possible 
level, it appears (consistent with the discussion in section V) that those banks were 
interested in opportunities other than note issuance. Hence, despite 118% growth in the 
number of banks in the MIDWEST, 360% in the SOUTH, and 437% in the WEST, note 
issuance remained suppressed in those regions. 
Figure 8c illustrates that, of banks that survived the period 1880-1900, 36% (546 
of 1,508) were minimum issuers and a roughly equal amount, 26% (397 of 1,508), were 
maximum issuers. Figure 8d shows that among those surviving banks, 26% maintained a 
constant IP (despite changes in the method for computing IP in 1882) and 67% reduced 
their IP across the period. Hence, only around 26% (397 banks) of banks that survived 
the period and 17% (411 banks) of entering banks, for a total of 808 banks out of 3,492, 
showed an interest in maximizing their note issuance in the period of 1880-1900.  
The fact that exiting banks tended to rely more on note issuing than average and 
that entering banks focused less on note issuing than average while remaining banks 
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reduced their issuance over our period provides further evidence that note issuing was not 
the primary profit center for national banks during our period. The regional patterns of 
entry, and the fact that new entrants in the low-issuing regions were especially low note 
issuers corroborates the James (1978) hypothesis that opportunities other than note 
issuing were particularly high in those regions. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The longstanding puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes disappears when 
one disaggregates the data to the level of individual banks, takes account of the limits 
banks faced on their maximum permissible note issues, and considers differences in 
opportunity costs of note issuing across banks.  Sixty-one percent of national banks in 
1880 and twenty-one percent of national banks in 1900 were maximum note issuers. 
Banks with low lending opportunities maximized their ability to issue notes, but could 
not issue more than a certain amount. Other banks, with high lending opportunities, 
rationally chose not to issue more notes. 
Models of redemption costs do not explain the substantial cross-sectional 
variation in the extent to which national banks chose to issue national bank notes. The 
theory that redemption risk explains underissuance of bank notes is inconsistent with the 
observed lack of any relationship between bank note issuance and excess reserve 
holdings.  
Furthermore, there seem to have been substantial economies of scope between 
note issuing, on the one hand, and deposit taking and lending, on the other hand. Those 
economies of scope probably included shared overhead costs as well as the ability to 
  30 
economize on the costs of maintaining mandatory minimum levels of reserves and capital 
when issuing notes. Combining deposit taking and note issuing allowed banks to make 
full use of capital and reserves that were legally required in support of note issuing but 
which exceeded warranted levels.  
National banks did not enter solely to issue national bank notes (what we call the 
pure “arbitrage” strategy), and once one takes proper account of the regulatory limits on 
issuance, and of the costs and benefits of entering purely to issue notes, that fact is not 
surprising.  Indeed, over the period 1880 to 1900, new entrants focused less on note 
issuing, while banks exiting were more likely to be maximum issuers. Note issuing was 
only profitable when combined with lending and deposit taking, and note issuing seems 
to have been a relatively unprofitable line of business for successful bankers. 
The puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes appears in large part to be an 
object lesson in the importance of disaggregating data, and thus avoiding misleading 
“representative bank” analysis relating average bank behavior and average bank 
opportunities.  
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  33Figure 1: Histogram for Issue Propensity -- All Issuers, 1880



















































































sFigure 3: Histogram for Issue Propensity -- All Issuers, 1900



















































































sFigure 5: Distribution of Issuance Across Regions
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1900Figure 5 (cont'd): Distribution of Issuance Across Regions
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1900Figure 6: The Financial Effects of Note Issue Arbitrage in 1880
Bonds to back 
Circulation
1,225 Notes 500




Assuming that government bonds earn 3.5% and taking into account the 1% tax on notes 
issued:
     Profits = 3.5% * 1,225 - 1% * 500
     Profits = 42.875 - 5.000
     Profits = 37.875
Dividing profits by capital and surplus yields:
     37.875 / (625 + 125) = 5.05% ROEFigure 7: The Financial Effects of Note Issue Arbitrage in 1880
Bonds to back 
Circulation
1,028 Notes 450




Assuming that government bonds earn 3.5% and taking into account the 1% tax on notes 
issued:
     Profits = 3.5% * 1,050 - 1% * 450
     Profits = 35.9625 - 4.500
     Profits = 31.4625
Dividing profits by capital and surplus yields:





































































































































































sTable 1: National Banking Laws Specifically Constraining Note Issue
Constraints on Maximum Note Issue:
1. If bank chartered before end of 1864, can issue up to 90% market value of bonds (not to exceed 90% of 
par if bonds pay greater than 5% interest), though not exceeding 100% capital. (p. 340 Act of March 3, 
1863) [coded the effective constraint as 90% of capital]
2. If bank chartered from beginning of 1865 to July 1870 (p. 364 Act of March 3, 1865):
• Banks with capital less than $500,000, can issue up to 90% capital;
• Banks with capital more than $500,000 and less than $1,000,000 can issue up to 80% capital;
• Banks with capital more than $1,000,000 and less than $3,000,000 can issue up to 75% capital;
• Banks with capital greater than $3,000,000 can issue up to 60% capital.
3. If bank chartered after 1870 then (p. 370 Act of July 12, 1870):
• No bank chartered after July 12, 1870 may issue more than $500,000 total.
     -- Banks with capital less than $500,000, can issue up to 90% capital (previous provision unaltered);
     -- Banks with capital more than $500,000 and less than $625,000 can issue up to 80% capital 
        (previous provision unaltered and 0.80*625,000=500,000);
4. After July 12, 1882, all banks may issue up to 90% of the par value of bonds backing the note issue, not 
exceeding 90% of capital. On March 14, 1900, the requirement was further relaxed to 100% of the par value 
of the bonds, not exceeding 100% of capital.
State bank notes not yet redeemed subsequent to conversion count as national bank notes in calculations of 
maxima. 
Constraints on Minimum Note Issue:
Banks must hold bonds to back circulation amounting to the maximum of $30,000 or 33% of capital. Since 
banks must hold 111% of notes in bonds to back the circulation, these note constraints mean that banks may 
issue notes amounting to the greater of $30,000*(1/1.11)=$27,027 or 33%*Capital*(1/1.11). After July 12, 
1882, the minimum bond requirement was revised to 25% of capital for banks with capital less than 
$150,000.
Source: National Monetary Commission. Laws of the United States Concerning Money, Banking, and Loans, 
1778-1909. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1910. Senate Document 580, part 2, 61st 
Congress, 2nd session.Table 2: Variable Definintions
Variable Name Definition
IP (Actual Notes – Minimum Required Issuance) / (Maximum Permissible Notes – 
Minimum Required Issuance)
IPTRUNC IP trucated from above at 0.98 and from below at 0.02.
TER Amount due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund / Total 
Liabilities
NER    For central reserve cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of 
the 5% Redemption Fund-
0.25*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities;
   For reserve cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% 
Redemption Fund-
0.125*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities;
   For other cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% 
Redemption Fund-
0.06*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities.
BER    For central reserve cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of 
the 5% Redemption Fund+
Due from Other Banks and Bankers-0.25*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities;
   For other cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% 
Redemption Fund+
Due from Other Banks and Bankers-0.15*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities.
NYC 1 if bank is located in New York City, 0 otherwise.
URBAN 1 if bank is located in Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans or San Francisco, 
0 otherwise.
LNTA Natural log of Total Assets
AGE Number of years since treceiving a National Bank charter.
SIZEAGE LNTA * AGE
ROAL For 1880: State-level: (Net Income)/(Total Assets)-0.02885*(Notes 
Outstanding)/(Total Assets)
For 1900: State-level: (Net Income)/(Total Assets)-0.01000*(Notes 
Outstanding)/(Total Assets)
LOANRAT Loans and Discounts/(Loans and Discounts+US Bonds on Hand+Other Stocks, 
Bonds, and Mortgages)
WDMK [(Total Capital in Manufacturingt-Total Capital in Manufacturingt-10)/Total Capital 
in Manufacturingt-10)]*
[Total Capital in Manufacturingt/(Total Capital in Manufacturingt+Total Capital in 
Agriculturet)]WDFK [(Total Capital in Agriculturet-Total Capital in Agriculturet-10) / Total Capital in 
Agriculturet-10]*
[1-Total Capital in Manufacturingt/(Total Capital in Manufacturingt+Total Capital in 
Agriculturet)]
WROAM [(Value of Products in Manufacturing-Total Wages in Manufacturing-Total Cost of 
Materials in Manufacturing) / 
Total Capital in Manufacturing]*[Total Capital in Manufacturing/(Total Capital in 
Manufacturing+
Total Capital in Agriculture)]
TLTA Total Liabilities / Total Assets
LNTL Natural log of Total Liabilities
NTL Notes Outstanding / Total Liabilities
NTLSQ NTL squared.
USDTD US Deposits / Total Deposits
IBDTD Due to Other Banks / Total Deposits
RCITY    For 1880: 1 if bank is located in: Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Albany, 
Pittsburgh, Washington, New Orleans, Louisville, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, 
Detroit,  Milwaukee, St. Louis, or San Francisco; 0 otherwise.
   For 1900: 1 if bank is located in: Boston, Albany, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, 
Baltimore, Washington, Savannah, New Orleans, Louisville, Houston, Cincinnati, 
Cleveland, Columbus, Indianapolis, Detroit, Milwaukee,  Des Moines, St. Paul, 
Minneapolis, Kansas City, St. Joseph, Lincoln, Omaha, Denver, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, or Portland; 0 otherwise.
CRCITY For 1880: 1 if bank is located in New York City; 0 otherwise.
For 1900: 1 if bank is located in New York City, Chicago, or St. Louis; 0 otherwise.
NEWENGL 1 if bank is located in CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, or VT; 0 otherwise.
MIDATL 1 if bank is located in DE, NJ, NY, or PA; 0 otherwise.
MIDWEST 1 if bank is located in IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, SD, ND, or DK 
(Dakota for 1880); 0 otherwise.
SOUTH 1 if bank is located in VA, AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, NC, SC, or TX; 0 otherwise.
APPALACH 1 if bank is located in KY, MD, TN, or WV; 0 otherwise.
WEST 1 if bank is located in CO, CA, OR, AZ, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY, WA, AK, or HI; 
0 otherwise.
NOTEOUT Bank notes outstanding.Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Name N Mean Median Std Error N Mean Median Std Error
IP 2094 0.8043 0.9889 0.0079 3879 0.2919 0.0913 0.0073
IPTRUNC 2094 0.8039 0.9800 0.0067 3879 0.3428 0.0913 0.0064
TER 2094 0.0012 0.0000 0.0001 3878 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
NER 2092 -0.0002 -0.0028 0.0011 3877 -0.0298 -0.0304 0.0005
BER 2092 0.0039 -0.0154 0.0020 3877 -0.0380 -0.0642 0.0016
NYC 2094 0.0229 0.0000 0.0033 3879 0.0113 0.0000 0.0017
URBAN 2094 0.0530 0.0000 0.0049 3879 0.0276 0.0000 0.0026
LNTA 2094 13.204 13.030 0.020 3879 13.194 13.060 0.018
AGE 2093 12.404 15.000 0.103 3879 19.015 17.000 0.197
SIZEAGE 2093 165.339 194.741 1.446 3879 256.790 218.844 2.762
ROAL 2060 -0.0361 0.0145 0.0161 3816 0.0182 0.0166 0.0001
LOANRAT 2094 0.9181 0.9687 0.0026 3879 0.8857 0.9413 0.0023
WDMK 1685 0.1323 0.0397 0.0141 3217 0.2772 0.1165 0.0138
WDFK 1685 0.0650 -0.0231 0.0169 3236 0.2531 0.0552 0.0127
WROAM 1704 0.1127 0.0550 0.0031 3261 0.1107 0.0767 0.0020
TLTA 2094 0.6389 0.6385 0.0022 3878 0.7190 0.7359 0.0018
LNTL 2094 12.7431 12.5695 0.0215 3878 12.8504 12.7279 0.0190
NTL 2094 0.3677 0.3450 0.0041 3878 0.1302 0.1001 0.0018
NTLSQ 2094 0.1700 0.1190 0.0035 3878 0.0293 0.0100 0.0009
USDTD 2092 2.70E-08 0.00E+00 5.94E-09 3878 7.98E-06 0.00E+00 7.02E-06
IBDTD 2092 0.0648 0.0156 0.0027 3878 0.0556 0.0091 0.0020
RCITY 2094 0.0912 0.0000 0.0063 3879 0.0781 0.0000 0.0043
CRCITY 2094 0.0229 0.0000 0.0033 3879 0.0157 0.0000 0.0020
NEWENGL 2094 0.2636 0.0000 0.0096 3879 0.1457 0.0000 0.0057
MIDATL 2094 0.2951 0.0000 0.0100 3879 0.2428 0.0000 0.0069
MIDWEST 2094 0.3152 0.0000 0.0102 3879 0.3702 0.0000 0.0078
SOUTH 2094 0.0430 0.0000 0.0044 3879 0.1070 0.0000 0.0050
APPALACH 2094 0.0592 0.0000 0.0052 3879 0.0626 0.0000 0.0039
WEST 2094 0.0181 0.0000 0.0029 3879 0.0526 0.0000 0.0036
NOTEOUT 2094 152,183 90,000 3,645 3879 73,430 45,000 3,251
1880 1900Table 4: OLS Models of Excess Reserves, 1880 and 1900


























N 2,092 3,877 2,092 3,877
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.511 0.443
Adj. R-squared -0.003 0.006 0.508 0.441
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept 0.0037 0.0018 0.1167 0.0469
0.0038 0.0008 0.0214 0.0067
TLTA 0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0378 -0.0491
0.0024 0.0006 0.0135 0.0052
LNTL -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0067 -0.0029
0.0002 0.0001 0.0013 0.0005
NTL -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0231 0.0137
0.0032 0.0011 0.0182 0.0090
NTLSQ 0.0016 -0.0030 0.0263 -0.0030
0.0034 0.0021 0.0191 0.0178
LOANRAT -0.0016 0.0000 -0.0168 -0.0045
0.0012 0.0004 0.0066 0.0030
USDTD -299.0 -0.0171 3,252.5 1.0742
506.3 0.1106 2,874.5 0.9172
IBDTD -0.0001 0.0000 0.0033 0.0323
0.0014 0.0005 0.0077 0.0039
RCITY 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0381 -0.0414
0.0006 0.0002 0.0033 0.0018
CRCITY -0.0002 0.0004 -0.1652 -0.1252
0.0011 0.0004 0.0064 0.0037
MIDATL 0.0002 0.0001 0.0126 0.0011
0.0004 0.0002 0.0024 0.0014
MIDWEST 0.0003 0.0002 0.0350 -0.0003
0.0004 0.0002 0.0025 0.0014
SOUTH 0.0009 0.0005 0.0449 0.0099
0.0007 0.0002 0.0043 0.0017
APPALACH -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0254 0.0007
0.0006 0.0002 0.0036 0.0019
WEST -0.0002 0.0001 0.0186 -0.0079

















Adj. R-squared 0.206 0.201
Coefficient Coefficient






























0.0143 0.0078Table 6: Marginal Effects from Reserves Models



























1880 1900 1880 1900 1880 1900
Initial condition: 0.00110 0.00024 -0.00634 -0.03751 0.00231 -0.06490
After $100,000 
increase in notes: 0.00108 0.00020 -0.00939 -0.03771 -0.02254 -0.08479
Difference: -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00306 -0.00020 -0.02485 -0.01989Table 7: Examples of Issuers with Extreme of Arbitrage Possibilities in 1880
Ten banks with the lowest OTHASS (other assets/assets)
Bank Name City State ln(Size) Age IP2 OTHASS DEPASS IP (Raw)
Montpelier Montpelier VT 13.726 15 0.980 0.316 0.508 0.993
First Watertown NY 12.337 17 0.949 0.364 0.474 0.949
First Manchester NH 13.010 15 0.980 0.396 0.597 0.989
NB Middlebury VT 13.226 15 0.980 0.401 0.568 0.988
N Landholders' Kingston RI 12.395 15 0.971 0.412 0.485 0.971
N Whaling B New London CT 12.973 15 0.980 0.419 0.559 1.016
First Stonington CT 13.262 15 0.980 0.422 0.534 0.984
Fourth Pittsburgh PA 13.659 16 0.980 0.426 0.597 1.000
Washington Westerly RI 12.882 15 0.980 0.440 0.491 0.999
Vineland Vineland NJ 12.021 2 0.980 0.448 0.684 1.000
Ten banks with the lowest DEPASS (other debt/assets)
Bank Name City State ln(Size) Age IP2 OTHASS DEPASS IP (Raw)
Casco Portland ME 14.402 15 0.020 0.972 0.332 -0.488
Caledonia Danville VT 12.265 15 0.385 0.722 0.355 0.385
Roger Williams Providence RI 13.755 15 0.064 0.798 0.362 0.064
N Exchange Houston TX 12.100 7 0.024 0.805 0.365 0.024
American Providence RI 14.751 15 0.259 0.738 0.375 0.259
Commercial Providence RI 14.333 15 0.304 0.698 0.382 0.304
Phenix Phenix RI 12.059 15 0.386 0.652 0.398 0.386
Belvedere Belvedere NJ 13.407 15 0.027 0.850 0.398 0.027
N Warren B Warren RI 12.856 15 0.506 0.648 0.404 0.506
Meriden Meriden CT 13.383 15 0.516 0.675 0.421 0.516Table 8: Tobit Models of Truncated Issue Propensity (IPTRUNC), 1880
(A) (B) (C)
Estimation Method Tobit Tobit Tobit






N 2,093 1,675 1,675
Log-likelihood -1688.1 -1371.2 -1353.0
Restricted Log-likelihood -1810.9 -1460.5 -1460.5
χ-squared 245.6 178.6 215.0
Significance (α) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept -0.2220 -0.3327 0.1755
0.9611 1.0885 1.0951
NYC -0.3709 -0.3441 -0.3690
0.1402 0.1481 0.1465
URBAN -0.1257 -0.1110 -0.1263
0.0906 0.0953 0.0951
SIZE 0.0999 0.1433 0.1092
0.0758 0.0846 0.0844
AGE 0.3499 0.3433 0.3354
0.0678 0.0754 0.0748




















Scale 0.7403 0.7361 0.7219
0.0221 0.0242 0.0237Table 9: Tobit Models of Truncated Issue Propensity (IPTRUNC), 1900
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Estimation Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit








N 3,879 3,217 3,217 3,236
Log-likelihood -3969.0 -3302.5 -3275.4 -3270.9
Restricted Log-likelihood -4142.2 -3436.0 -3436.0 -3451.2
χ-squared 346.5 267.2 321.2 360.6
Significance (α) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept -5.4395 -4.2166 -4.6937 -5.3059
0.4738 0.5644 0.5729 0.5859
NYC -0.4323 -0.1762 -0.3280 -0.1059
0.2149 0.2224 0.2238 0.2263
URBAN -0.8743 -0.8170 -0.8629 -0.6570
0.1455 0.1557 0.1555 0.1593
SIZE 0.4068 0.3836 0.4123 0.4839
0.0368 0.0416 0.0417 0.0442
AGE 0.2134 0.2165 0.2268 0.2142
0.0208 0.0241 0.0241 0.0240
SIZEAGE -0.0153 -0.0156 -0.0165 -0.0157
0.0016 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
MIDATL 0.1580 0.1508 0.0448
0.0666 0.0840 0.0857
MIDWEST -0.1515 -0.1167 -0.2750
0.0638 0.0836 0.0892
SOUTH -0.2402 -0.2051 -0.3346
0.0876 0.1146 0.1166
APPALACH 0.1034 0.1997 0.0873
0.0973 0.1116 0.1129
WEST -0.5197 -0.5959 -0.7574
0.1123 0.1349 0.1368
ROAL -6.4553 -4.8212 -5.9485
3.0933 3.6110 3.5858
LOANRAT -0.9267 -0.7635 -0.7431
0.1633 0.1697 0.1685






Scale 1.1347 1.1407 1.1276 1.1188
0.0275 0.0304 0.0300 0.0298